This study examines the impact of geographic dispersion and technological mediation on the organizing processes of a virtual network organization. Listserv and conference call records from the approximately two-year existence of the Continental Direct Action Network were analyzed in order to examine how the virtualness of this organization impacted participants' perceptions of opportunity, balance of latency and mobilization, formation of a collective identity, and formation of affective bonds. The results reveal some of the local/global tensions that may exist in the organizing processes of virtual network organizations. They also demonstrate that an identity tension may emerge when new geographic localities join an already existing virtual network organization. It is suggested that new routes for informal communication among geographic localities may be necessary in order to enhance these processes and socialize new members into the network.
In social movements, the new norm is organizations that span the
globe, forge alliances among several parties, and have the ability
to mobilize protests against global organizations such as the World
Trade Organization (WTO) (Gerlach, 1999; Knoke, 1990). However,
organizational communication research has just scratched the surface
in attempting to understand these organizational forms (Ahuja &
Carley, 1998; DeSanctis & Monge, 1998; Goldman, Nagel, &
Preiss, 1994; Monge & Fulk, 1999; Palmer, 1998). Research is
needed on the internal dynamics of social movement organizations
(SMOs) (Melucci, 1998), especially the internal dynamics of virtual
SMOs. The research reported in this article uses a case study to
examine how the virtualness of an SMO impacts its most basic
organizing processes.
The case study examines how virtual communication impacts organizing
processes in SMOs. Relying on social movement scholarship (McCarthy
& Zald, 1977; Melucci, 1988; Tarrow, 1992, 1996, 1998), we
define four organizing processes that occur in social movements: the
framing of external opportunity, the tension between mobilization
and latency, the framing of an organizational identity, and the
formation of affective bonds. In this analysis, we examine how the
virtual structure impacts each of these processes. Using Continental
Direct Action Network (CDAN) as a case study, we examine the
internal communication of an SMO from emergence to demise.
A virtual network organization is defined as "a geographically
distributed organization whose members are bound by long-term common
interests or goals, and who communicate and coordinate their work
through information technology" (Ahuja & Carley, 1998, p.
5). Virtual network organizations are considered one of the new
organizational forms that technology makes possible (Dutton, 1999).
Previous research and theory related to virtual network
organizations has focused on management of risk (Grabowski &
Roberts, 1998), structure (Ahuja & Carley, 1998; Nohria &
Berkley, 1994), organizational identification (Wiesenfeld, Raghuram,
& Garud, 1998), use of technology (Palmer, 1998), roles
(Bosch-Sijtsema, 2002), trust (Ariss, Nykodyma, & Cole-Laramore,
2002; Crossman & Lee-Kelley, 2004; Handy, 1995), and management
of workers (Rollier & Liou, 1998; Staples, Hulland, &
Higgins, 1998). A concern at the core of these studies is how
information communication technology and geographic distribution
effect organizing communication. The present research is similarly
focused on the impact of these factors.
Social movement scholars have recognized that changes, similar to
the changes in for-profit organizations described by virtual network
organization scholars, are occurring within and among SMOs.
Researchers have examined the geographically-distributed and
technology-mediated structures that appear to be operating in the
environmental movement (Gerlach, 1999) and the landmine ban movement
(Rutherford, 2000). Other researchers have noted the growth of
non-governmental organizations (NGOs), both in terms of number of
organizations and the density of alliances among NGOs (Guidry,
Kennedy, & Zald, 2000; Smith, 1997). An increase in the use of
information communication technologies has greatly impacted the
social movement sector (Meyers, 1994). However, despite an increased
recognition of the impact of virtualness, little research to date
has examined how geographic dispersion and reliance on information
communication technologies have impacted SMO organizing.
Social theory has sought to explain the dynamics of social movements. Social movement scholars (McCarthy & Zald, 1977; Melucci, 1988; Tarrow, 1992, 1996, 1998) have identified four organizing processes that occur within most SMOs: framing of external demands, managing mobilization and latency, framing a collective identity, and forming affective bonds. In the following sections we describe each of these processes and the potential impacts of virtualness on the processes.
Framing External Demands
The framing of external demands is one of the key organizing processes
for SMOs. Political opportunity theorists note that changes in external
political signals can indicate possible fruitful mobilization. Tarrow
(1996) identifies several types of external opportunities including
changes in policy regarding an issue, changes in representatives,
changes in the groups addressing an issue, and state change. More
broadly, external demands can be conceptualized as any requested action
made, mobilization opportunity considered, or external opportunities
available to SMOs. We define framing external demands as the process of
defining social issues of interest and selecting opportunities for
mobilization (i.e., protests, campaigns). Although all organizations are
impacted by the way that they frame the external world, these processes
are particularly central for SMOs, since they are organized to engage
issues and organizations external to the SMO (Tarrow, 1992, 1996, 1998).
The framing of these external demands mediates the impact of
opportunities on the SMO (Guidry et al., 2000; Tarrow, 1996).
Framing is an important process internally for SMO members and
externally for publics. Internally, framing creates "mentally
stored clusters of ideas" that guide information processing
(Entman, 1993, p. 53). After SMO members collectively define the social
issue and select opportunities, the SMO attempts to frame the issues for
publics in protests, materials, and mass media campaigns.
The framing of external demands may be of special importance to virtual
network organizations. The virtual network form is without boundaries
(Hirschhorn & Gilmore, 1992), and differentiating between external
and internal demands is nearly impossible. However, this absence of
boundaries can be advantageous. Contingency theorists argue that the
virtual network form has a unique advantage in especially complex and
turbulent environments, since its lack of boundaries allows it to adapt
more quickly to changes (Achrol, 1991; Cravens, Piercy, & Shipp,
1996; Djelic & Anamo, 1999; Goldman et al., 1994; Ring & Van de
Ven, 1992). However, contingency theorists view external demands as
market demands, rather than the type of demands posed by social movement
theory. Thus, it is not clear how this lack of boundaries will impact
organizing in SMOs. Therefore, we begin to explore this area by asking
how the virtualness of CDAN, the case examined in this research,
impacted its framing of external opportunities.
RQ1: How did CDAN's virtual network structure impact the framing of external opportunities?
In this case study, we examine how CDAN members framed external protest opportunities, solicitations to participate or endorse an activity, and the process CDAN members used to evaluate external opportunities. We considered how CDAN's virtual structure facilitated and failed to facilitate processing these opportunities. Finally, we considered the mixture of local DAN activities and national/global activities that CDAN determined to be worthy of its attention.
Internal Dynamics
The internal dynamics of SMOs are integral to the change they seek (Melucci, 1998). Melucci argues that SMOs create "social spaces" to practice the type of society that they eventually wish to have. Many newer SMOs operate on a collective network principle. Melucci (1994) describes the structure of these movements as "a hidden network." This type of network, he says, "allows multiple memberships; is part-time with respect to both the life course and to the amount of time it absorbs; and requires the personal commitment and affective solidarity of those who belong to it" (p. 127). These networks disperse the load among their nodes and thus more effectively deal with the problems of turnover and burnout. Internal processes in these SMOs include: the tension between mobilization and latency, the formation and maintenance of a collective identity, and the formation and maintenance of affective bonds.
Mobilization and Latency
Melucci (1994) states that these networks handle the problems of
burnout and turnover by operating in two modes: mobilization and
latency. Mobilization is the process where resources and
communication are brought to bear on the social change that the SMOs
wish to make in the world (McCarthy & Zald, 1977; Melucci,
1994). These resources include a support base (McCarthy & Zald,
1977), strategies and tactics (McCarthy & Zald, 1977), leaders
(Zald & Ash, 1966), core technology (Hannan & Freeman,
1977), funding (Freeman, 1979), and relations to society (McCarthy
& Zald, 1977). Latency, in contrast, is "a sort of
underground laboratory for antagonism and innovation," where a
network can "work out all of the kinks" (Melucci, 1994, p.
128). Membership can change dynamically in this phase. As long as
the network exists, the movement exists. Only minimal maintenance is
required for network latency. Minimal maintenance of a social
movement may include such activities as only occasional network
meetings or listserv check-ins. Minimal maintenance may also include
only occasional refreshing of an Internet presence, such as a
website, or just making sure that such a presence is still
available. Minimal maintenance would include any activity that makes
sure that the network is still a presence, even when not engaged in
any actual mobilization activities.
Both latency and mobilization are important to SMOs, and they
require different communications strategies. Latency communication
should be inclusive and accepting of diverse viewpoints within the
movement. This type of communication is conducive to negotiating
identity, socialization, and the development of best practices
(Cohen, 1985). The communication should be such that people can
leave the movement to attend to other affairs and return.
Mobilization communication keeps people focused on the task at hand
and the goals to be realized. Both types of communication may be
influenced by the virtualness of the organization.
Virtual network organization research has tended to focus on
for-profit organizations and the business implications of these new
organizational forms (Ahuja & Carley, 1998; Grabowski &
Roberts, 1998; Handy, 1995; Nohria & Berkley, 1994; Palmer,
1998; Rollier & Liou, 1998; Staples et al., 1998; Wiesenfeld et
al., 1998). However, to date, this research has not examined the
impact of the virtual network form on mobilization or latency. The
virtual network structure complicates the latency/mobilization
dynamic. In a traditional localized SMO, the entire organization
moves from one phase to another. The geographically-dispersed
network structure raises the possibilities of phase fractures within
the network. Geographic nodes (i.e., the local DANs) in the virtual
network form operate with a degree of autonomy. This may lead
different geographic nodes to mobilization or latency. If some
geographic nodes are in latency while others are mobilized,
especially around national/global issues, it may lead to tensions
within the SMO. Thus, we also investigate:
RQ2: What latency and mobilization tensions can be attributed to CDAN's virtual network structure?
Collective Identity
A third SMO process is the creation, maintenance, and modification
of collective identity. Collective identity is the combination of
SMO members' "cognitive, moral, and emotional connection with a
broader community, category, practice or institution" (Polletta
& Jasper, 2001, p. 285). At the organizational level, collective
identity is how a movement sees itself and how it defines itself
through its actions. Collective identity is transmitted through the
network via communication processes such as framing, "in which
identities are announced, or renounced, embraced or rejected, and
modified or reframed in the course of various interactions"
(Snow, 2001, p. 7). This process involves the collective naming and
negotiating of the organization's identity.
The virtual structure of an SMO has the potential to impact
collective identity. Since members are geographically dispersed and
have no headquarters, collective identity in the local geographic
nodes may be in tension with the larger collective identity of the
virtual network SMO. Handy (1995) contends that virtual network
organizations have a more difficult task in establishing trust among
members, and should travel in order to establish that trust.
Wiesenfeld et al. (1998) found that organizational identification
was moderated by the number of days spent working virtually.
Together, these authors note that the processes of developing a
collective identity can be impacted by the degree of participation
and the virtual structure of the organization. However, both of
these authors address these processes in for-profit organizations,
where the current research examines a virtual SMO. In addition,
these authors fail to recognize how the framing process may or may
not lead to a collective identity that transcends geographic
distance. Therefore, we examine the role of framing plays in the
development of such a collective identity.
RQ3: How did CDAN's virtual network structure impact its collective identity communication?
Affective Bonds
In addition to mechanisms for mobilization, latency, and the
maintenance of a collective identity, Melucci (1994) identifies the
formation of affective bonds as an important SMO process. Affective
bonds are emotional ties that may either bring people into a group
or that may be formed and reinforced during collective actions.
These emotional ties provide motivation for individuals to
participate in collective action (Jasper, 1998). Additionally,
emotional ties can help drive collective actors towards their goals
(Jasper, 1998).
The formation of affective bonds depends on communication within the
network (Snow, 2001). A tight-knit communication network that
encourages interaction among the members of an SMO can lead to the
development of affective bonds. Hian, Chuan, Trevor and Detenber
(2004) found that relational intimacy could even be stronger in
computer-mediated relationships than in face-to-face relationships.
However, their experiment required social interaction among the
participants, whereas in bona fide virtual network organizations
interaction is not required. Indeed, Sias and Cahill (1998) found
that proximity is a predictor of friendship formation in the
workplace. By extension, the propensity of individuals to form
friendships in virtual SMOs might be inhibited by geographic
barriers. The virtualness of the organization might impact the
degree to which informal communication occurs among
geographically-distant parties. Each of these factors leads us to
investigate the formation of affective bonds in the CDAN network.
RQ4: How did CDAN's virtual network structure impact the formation of affective bonds?
The following case study will demonstrate how a virtual network SMO struggled with the effects of geographic dispersion and technological mediation on their organizing processes. The purpose of this research is to demonstrate how this strategy impacted basic organizing processes like the framing of external opportunities, the latency/mobilization tension, collective identity, and affective bonds. While geographic dispersion and non-hierarchical structure offer advantages of greater flexibility and response to turbulent environments, they also present organizing challenges. These advantages and challenges are evident in the CDAN case.
Continental Direction Action Network Case
The November 30th (N30) protests in Seattle marked a watershed
moment for SMOs related to globalization (Danaher & Burbach,
2000). CDAN was the primary SMO that brought together international
protest resources to shut down the WTO in late 1999 (deArmond,
2000). However, by April 17, 2001, this group dissolved and gave
away its funding to other groups.
CDAN was a coalition of anti-globalization activists who were
actively involved in the shut-down of the WTO in Seattle and the
International Monetary Fund (IMF)/World Bank protests in Washington
D.C. This group attempted to spread their direct action techniques
to other anti-globalization events such as the protests at the
Republican and Democratic National Conventions and the Free Trade
Area of the Americas (FTAA) protests (Center for the Advancement of
Non-violence, 2002). CDAN organized itself non-hierarchically around
geographic affinity groups that would delegate a "spoke"
to participate in spokescouncil meetings, composed of other spokes.
According to early organizer Nadine Bloch, CDAN's mission was,
"to provide this framework to connect people so that we have
the strength or the power in numbers that we can actually do global
work" (WTO history project, 2000, ¶26). CDAN wanted the
anti-globalization movement to be as global as the entities it was
fighting. As such, the group acted as a globally distributed network
of smaller direct action networks (DANs). The business of the larger
group was conducted, except for one meeting early in the
group’s history, through spokescouncil phone calls and a
listserv. The purpose of this case study is to examine the way that
the virtual network structure impacted the processes essential to
SMO organizing.
A case study methodology is utilized in this research. Case study methodology is a "real-life" methodology (Sypher, 1990) that seeks to describe "events in such a way as to enhance our understanding and bolster our insights in ways that other methods could or normally would not do" (p. 4). The current research used a grounded theory approach to the case study methodology. Frey, Botan, Friedman, and Kreps (1991) prescribe this methodology for the reconstructed case. They argue that grounded theory case study analysis should not only be descriptive but "identify appropriate strategies that were used or that could have been used to solve problems experienced in that particular situation" (pp. 209-210). In other words, not only must a case study follow certain steps and be grounded in research and theory from the relevant fields, it must also highlight solutions that were used in the case, or suggest strategies for solving those problems.
Procedure
This research utilizes the online listerv and spokescouncil meeting minutes of CDAN. The researchers downloaded all archived listserv messages and spokescouncil meeting minutes from the organization's website. This yielded 305 pages of text. Listserv messages accounted for approximately 87% of text. The researchers engaged in a two-phase coding processes.
Axial Coding
First, the researchers engaged in axial coding (Strauss &
Corbin, 1998). In this process, the researchers examined the data
from varying SMO processes that had been identified in previous
research. These included: external opportunity, mobilization,
latency, collective identity, affective bonds, and other.
External opportunity was indicated in the transcripts in three ways.
First, requests for CDAN action of any time (endorsement, protest,
funds, membership request, etc.) was coded as an external
opportunity. Second, discussions of potential impacts of
opportunities the group recognized for protest and lobbying were
coded as external opportunity. Finally, discussions of the number of
different opportunities and how to manage these different requests
were coded as external opportunities.
Mobilization communication indicated when CDAN reported engaging or
planned to engage in action that had the potential to impact social
issues about which they cared. This included protests, production of
materials, and financial support of direct actions against
corporation/government groups. In contrast, latency communication
was indicated when the group discussed the support functions of the
organization, such as meetings to discuss budget, lags in membership
communication, letter-writing to supporters, and training.
Communication about collective identity was indicated when
discussion focused on what CDAN was, when the group discussed past
triumphs in order to plan current action, and when the organization
questioned its directions. In addition, collective identity
communication was indicated when newcomers to CDAN were taught the
basic principles of the social movement and/or were taught about
collective actions in which the group had participated in the past.
Communication about affective bonds was indicated when the group
shared emotional stories with one another, acknowledged each other's
personal contribution, or provided emotional support to one another.
Process Coding
Through the axial coding, the central concept of virtual network structure emerged as an explanation of the various actions occurring in each of these categories. After identifying this central concept, we engaged in process coding (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). Process coding encourages researchers to examine evolving interaction over time. It is through this coding that the reconstructed case was developed.
Writing the Reconstructed Case
After process coding, we began to write the reconstructed case. Each
of the research questions focused on how each of the above
processes/communication was influenced by CDAN's virtual network
structure. In order to understand how the virtual network structure
impacted each of these processes, we examined incidents of
miscommunication and non-communication among organizational members.
In addition, we compared CDAN's organizing processes to established
descriptions of SMO organizing processes. Finally, we noted factors
in CDAN's organizing that lead to the disbanding of the group and
how those factors related to its virtual network organizational
structure.
In order to write the case, we reviewed the data a third time,
highlighting passages from the listserv and spokescouncil minutes
that demonstrated the developing tensions related to the virtual
network structure. These passages were used in the results and
discussion to build the reconstructed case. In the next section, we
first review the case and then address each of the research
questions.
CDAN formed in response to the 1999 WTO N30 protests in Seattle. The
organization was somewhat astounded at its success, prompting
several members to attempt to create a sustainable network out of
this successful group. CDAN had one face-to-face meeting shortly
after the WTO protest. During this meeting, they developed the CDAN
Principles of Unity. These included commitment to anti-globalization
causes and consensus decision-making.
The remainder of the CDAN meetings and information sharing were
conducted through the listserv and spokescouncil teleconferences.
Early local DAN groups included Seattle, Los Angeles, New York,
Northern Humboldt, Boston, Dallas, and Denver. The groups began
organizing in support of Los Angeles’ local DAN's protest of
the Democratic National Convention. The actions in such places as
Los Angeles became a rallying point and point of pride. Chris Crass,
who moved from San Francisco to Los Angeles to participate in the
actions, shared these reflections in early October 2000:
While living in LA, I went to lots of rallies and marches in the city – from anti-vivisection/animal liberation protests, to large actions against the Gulf War, to demonstrations against police brutality. I grew up with a lot of the organizers who were working with Rise Up!/LA Direct Action Network. I was looking forward to working with friends, but I was also excited to be part of a mass mobilization in the streets of LA.
Stories like this, concerning the "early" days of CDAN,
stirred the imaginations of activists. They promised both a feeling
of accomplishing something great and working together in solidarity
and friendship.
In part due to the early success of the group, local DANs began
forming and contacting the group to join. At one point in time, 19
local DANs existed. Every week, new conferences, speakers, and
issues were brought to CDAN for support. One of the key turning
points occurred when the San Diego DAN developed a nationwide
proposal against Citigroup. Using CDAN principles, they submitted
the proposal for the support of the group. However, rather than
accepting these proposals, conversations ensued concerning the
identity of the organization as either an organization or network.
According to the minutes of an October 7 meeting, Heather from the
Humboldt County DAN asked a fundamental question about CDAN's
organizing. Was CDAN a network of independent groups or an
organization? Instead of provoking a discussion or eliciting answers
from those in attendance, this crucial question of group identity
was largely ignored.
Shortly after this incident, further problems with new members
began. Another SMO was raided by federal agents and the group began
to have concerns that they were being monitored. CDAN created
barriers for local DANs to enter the network. These included several
levels of assurances that the group was not spying for the federal
government. Several groups had trouble providing sufficient support
that they were who they claimed to be.
By this point and time, older groups began to be absent for
spokescouncil teleconferences and failed to respond to listserv
queries. Several members of older groups had either fallen into
latency or had dissolved altogether. This frustrated many of the
newer members, who became resentful that they could not get
responses. Newer groups seeking affiliation, such as Baltimore,
found that spokes in CDAN had never seen their proposals for
membership. When CDAN did respond, it did not do so in a timely
fashion. Finally, the listserv went silent, except for a brief
discussion of what to do with the monies left in the bank account
several months later.
In the next sections, each of the organizing processes is discussed.
The impact of CDAN virtualness on each of these processes is
highlighted. Finally, we make suggestions for mechanisms that could
benefit other virtual SMOs.
External Opportunities and CDAN
RQ 1 inquired how CDAN's virtual network structure impacted its
framing of external opportunities. CDAN began with a bang. The
protests in Seattle marked a huge success in the minds of most
anti-globalization SMOs. In part, their success was due to their
protest strategy. CDAN organized broad coalitions of anti-WTO
groups, ranging from the Ruckus Society to the AFL-CIO. They created
a protest structure that had layers of involvement (de Armond,
2000). People who were willing to be arrested were put closest to
the police. Those who wanted to be engaged were given other tactics.
The groups were connected through walkie-talkies and laptops. When
the police jammed their signals, they bought cell phones (de Armond,
2000). The result was that the protestors had a clearer layout of
what was occurring in the city than the police did.
After Seattle, CDAN had momentum. They protested at the 2000
Democratic and 2000 Republic National conventions, and sent a
contingent to the IMF protests. They were frequently approached by
groups requesting support for their proposals so that they could
"put the CDAN endorsement" on their flyers. An organizer
for the Citiaction group posted to the CDAN listserv,
We would like to say to the world that the Continental Direct Action Network supports and endorses the Citiaction campaign, and be able to advertise this fact on our web site and in various forms of literature … We would like to have the various local DAN groups individually become part of the citiaction campaign and organize local events to whatever degree they see fit.
CDAN was also invited by the Citiaction Campaign to take "some
ownership" of the campaign and develop its own statement of
purpose. However, among the various DAN spokes, this proposal
developed little but talk.
The national groups took advantage of fewer and fewer opportunities
over time. One potential reason for the decline was burnout.
Although information technology allowed each opportunity for protest
to reach the group, there was little consensus in how to handle all
of the requests. The openness of the network made them susceptible
to constant proposals and requests for support. One of the CDAN
spokes, Rahula, from the North Humboldt DAN, raised the issue of
endorsements of actions by other organizations:
Personally, I feel like we need to clarify our whole endorsement process before moving forward with any more endorsements … The relationship between CDAN and certain ngo's is a big controversy in some circles right now. while I wouldn't want to see CDAN operate solely in reaction to knee jerk critics, I also think we should consider where those critiques are coming from and how we wish to address them … Taking on a campaign that was initiated and controlled by one of the ngo's in question may be something we should give extra thought to.
Though Rahula made it known in this post that she was speaking for
herself and not her local group, it raises the issue of CDAN's
susceptibility to endorsement requests. Rahula was also one of the
many spokes who raised the question of whether CDAN was an
organization or a network.
Another potential impact of the virtualness on the framing of
external opportunity was the inability to distinguish local,
national, and global purposes. Each of the local DANs had several
local issues and events that they organized. For example, during the
October 7th conference call, the North Humboldt and San Diego groups
were reporting holding solidarity actions with the U'wa, a Columbian
indigenous tribe that was fighting Occidental Petroleum over access
to tribal lands. The San Diego group was also planning an activist
training camp for November. These local events were organized and
run without the need for the larger network. However, larger
national or global events were difficult to organize, since the
local DANs were busy with local issues. The virtual network, though
it had geographic advantages, also had geographic liabilities for
CDAN.
Mobilization and Latency
RQ 2 inquired how CDAN's virtual network structure, which made it so successful in organizing the Seattle N30 WTO protests, influenced the tension between mobilization and latency. After its initial success, CDAN was bombarded with requests to from local DANs to become a member of the CDAN network. After approximately one year, there were nearly 19 local DANs who were officially members of CDAN. They each had joined at different times, and were in different stages of their local formation. This often led to disjunctive reports during spokescouncil meetings. For example, the following summary of regional activity from a spokescouncil meeting is very typical of the meetings:
* * * REGIONAL CHECK INS –Seattle: haven't had a meeting in awhile; thinking about the next big think [sic] locally, and the next big thing extra-locally. No big current projects right now. –Southeast: Students are just getting back; a lot of anti Wal Mart work being done; having a network picnic next month; doing SOA work. –Denver: haven't met or had a chance to discuss CDAN issues. Denver has a working group call "the future of our dan" to discuss things. There was an action in Aspen last week at a globalization conference (is that right?), they shouted down Wolfenson (?). –Nohum: haven't met recently due to dnc; regrouping, dealing with old growth logging issues. –San Diego: working on a proposal against Citigroup; dealing with deregulation issues, planning to go to a globalization conference in Tiajuana. –NYC: a lot of R2K legal follow up; also considering a Citigroup campaign. Supporting several strikes; ready to evaluate next steps.
In this very typical example, different regional groups were in
different phases of development. Melucci (1994) contends that SMOs
need both latency and mobilization phases. However in CDAN, some
local DANs were in a mobilization phase, like NYC and San Diego in
this example. Meanwhile, other local DANs, like Seattle and Nohum
(North Humboldt County, California), were in latency phases. The
CDAN movement was fractured in terms of the phases in which its
various locals operated. There were tensions among the various local
DANs as a result of these phase fractures. Social movement theory
provides little guidance on this type of phase fractures in an SMO.
However, our research demonstrates that in geographically-dispersed
networks that rely solely on mediated communication, it can be
difficult for those members to know who is in a latency phase and
who is in a mobilization phase. Melucci's research does not account
for this and assumes that an entire movement, or network, is in
latency or mobilization phase.
For CDAN, these geographic tensions were troublesome to groups that
were in a mobilization phase. Many could not understand why some
groups moved to latency. In March of 2001, Heather from the NoHum
group was asked at one point to work on the procedural issues that
CDAN used in its formal consensus process. She responded:
The problem is that NoHum DAN is not really meeting anymore. I am not sure when we will start meeting again. But, as of now, most of us were working on our own campaigns. I want to wait till after the FTAA to assess (sic) where NoHum DAN will go and whether it will continue.
Clearly those in the NoHum DAN group felt they needed time off from DAN to pursue other interests. This was hardly the first fracture in the network. Elijah Saxon from the Seattle group reported to the DAN listserv in February:
So long Sea-Town! Hello all, There is no more Seattle DAN. We have not met for many months, and everyone is doing other things like citiaction, ftaa, IMC, etc., I don't know what the process for formally removing Seattle from the network, but I think it is about time.
Elijah's post reveals several significant issues that were never dealt with by CDAN as a whole. These issues included no process for leaving the network and a failure to incorporate other movements into a broader anti-authoritarian network. The failure to communicate about these issues apparently caused a ripple effect as DANs started leaving, Other DAN groups that tried to organize on a regional level were pulling apart. Cathie Berry, who worked with the DAN group in the Southeast United States reported the problems with keeping together a group that was dispersed over a larger geographical area:
well, as you know, we are no longer SEDAN. the hope was to have the most active groups represent themselves on the call. the problem is, there really doesn't seem much to be going on out there. asheville dan has been the most active, but they too are in a low, as a matter of fact, the woman who was to be the spokes, stepped down last week, and we have no replacement at this time. i am really busy with student teaching and have no time or energy that is needed to really keep this all going, so for right now, we have no spokes. i just wanted to let y'all know why i and this region have been so quiet lately.
This is a clear example of how difficult it was to keep together
DANs that were organized in a larger regional area. Even within
these regions, there were geographic tensions. But these geographic
tensions were not present in the initial group, since everyone was
in mobilization phases. The network had no mechanism, formal or
informal, for accommodating latency.
However, as groups were added and local DANs began to develop their
own activities, the group began move in different directions. This
tension was further exacerbated when a proposal to mount a large
protest against Citigroup was proposed by the San Diego DAN. The San
Diego DAN asked CDAN to endorse the proposal. However, many local
DANs had moved to latency phases, and were in no position to
mobilize a campaign against Citigroup. This tension led to the
following prototypical statement from a local DAN in a latency
phases:
. . . since each local dan is autonomous, I'm not sure why it is so important to get a cdan endorsement. The focus of each group obviously varies according to location and the makeup of its members. While a Citigroup campaign may be appropriate for some, it may not be for others. And I personal feel like it's absolutely ok for one, or several, dan groups to take on a campaign that one or several other dan groups do not.
In a sense, the groups in latency were asking for others to go ahead. However, the local DANs in the mobilization phase looked for "legitimate" reasons why some of the groups in a latency phase might not want to participate. They asked about the tactics used, the philosophy of the protest, and for legitimate differences in opinion. None came from those in the latency phase. Instead, these groups became more and more quiet. Calls for increased participation from groups and total mobilization were frequent, especially from the New York group who never entered a latency phase during the existence of CDAN. Instead, New York analyzed the current situation by examining the numbers of those who were "officially part of the network" and those who were currently active.
Header: 19 groups
NYC, NC, Southeast groups, Seattle, San Francisco, Miami, Santa Cruz, Buffalo, MidHudson, Texas, Baltimore, Denver, Kentucky, San Diego, Arizona, Los Angeles, Vermont, Chicago, Northern Humboldt. . . now just think how exciting it would be if everyone showed.
The groups in latency phases responded to these calls for mobilization from the NY group by further withdrawing. The network continued to urge DANs out of the latency phase. This lead to statements from the spokes in the mobilization groups like "Please don't be so quiet- what are you all up to???" Finally the mobilization groups became so tired that the listserv went quiet for several months, only to be interrupted by a brief email about how to disperse the remaining funds the bank account.
Framing of Collective Identity
Another vital process for SMOs is the framing of a collective
identity (McPherson, 1990; Snow & Benford, 1992). Collective
identity is how the movement describes itself. RQ 3 asked how CDAN's
virtual network structure impacted the formation/maintenance of a
collective identity. CDAN originally defined itself as a network of
local organizations committed to democracy, local autonomy, and
consensus decision-making. However, their identity was evident in
the frequent references back to the protest in Seattle. Success at
fighting global trade and finance organizations was clearly part of
CDAN's mission. As such, only policies dealing with
anti-globalization were initially considered. Over time, with the
addition of new DANs to the organization, CDAN's collective identity
began to change. This was evident in changes to its membership
policy, as the group became more insular and less accepting of other
groups. As shown below, potential new participants were required to
show affirmatively that they were not federal agents and also began
to require an endorsement from an existing DAN group.
At one time, the network simply ignored the piling requests for
information from others. Over 120 email requests for information
were ignored for nearly a month from groups that wanted to join
CDAN, like a group in Buffalo, New York. Finally, there seems to be
evidence that people wanting to come into the CDAN network were
confused about what being in CDAN was all about and that CDAN was
equally confused about some of the groups wanting to become part of
the network. Brooke Lehman from NYC DAN wrote the following to the
group from Dallas that was applying for membership on October 6,
2000:
"Though our by-laws do not require it, all the CDAN groups that presently participate function non-hierarchically in decision-making. I am confused by how your group uses consensus given the distinctions between directors, steering committee, and general membership."
Failing to frame the collective identity, or socialize any new participants in the organization was one indication of the changing focus of the CDAN network. The updated membership guidelines were submitted after this lag in membership communication:
So you want to link to Continental DAN. We are happy to have you so long as: 1. You are not Feds 2. Your group has endorsed DAN Principles of Unity and structure and is committed to upholding these principles both internally as a group and externally in the work that you engage in. 3. You are not so close to another CDAN group (or so tiny) that it wouldn't really make more sense for your group to coordinate a shared spoke with a neighboring pre-existing CDAN group … DAN is committed to "an organizational philosophy based on decentralization, direct democracy, non-hierarchy and local autonomy" and we are not interested in working in CDAN with groups that operate otherwise 4. If possible, [include] a note from an existing DAN, verifying that you are as cool and straight up as you make yourself out to be.
Several authors have noted that trust is difficult to establish in
virtual network organizations (Crossman & Lee-Kelley, 2004;
Handy, 1995). Clases, Bachmann, and Weghner (2003) note that shared
bonds and shared experience in the practical realization of projects
are keys to trust in virtual organizing. Handy (1995) argues that
members must meet face-to-face to develop trust. As shared
experiences in Seattle became less common and fewer people knew each
other, trust seemed more tenuous within CDAN. Difficulty in
developing trust in virtual network SMOs, like CDAN, may be
exacerbated by animosity toward and suspicion of other
organizations. Fear of government reprisal and infiltration made it
difficult for CDAN members to have a high degree of trust in the
network, constantly fearing that either the listserv or the
integrity of the network had been compromised.
Another key turning point in CDAN's collective identity was the
Citigroup initiative. The Citigroup initiative asked each local DAN
to sign off on an endorsement proposal. San Diego DAN hoped that the
protest would "carry the CDAN name," which had a
considerable reputation after the Seattle protests. However, CDAN's
initial principles of unity were designed as a network based on
decentralization and local autonomy. Soon after the Citigroup
requests, other requests came for CDAN to endorse other protests.
These requests for endorsement created an identity crisis for CDAN.
Were they a network with local autonomy, and therefore not able
endorse a protest? Or were they an organization, and therefore
required to solicit agreement to endorse the same things? This point
was highlighted by the North Humboldt DAN spokesperson:
… all of this also brings up for me a big question that I feel has never been satisfactorily addressed or answered, which is, are we a network or are we an organization? I think a dan gathering will be a good place to do real work answering that question, but … as i consider a network to be preferable, I don't see a need for things that are more appropriate for an organization, such as one main campaign for the whole of cdan.
The tension between being a network and being an organization was repeated throughout the lifespan of CDAN. At its inception, CDAN was a network; it operated like a network. However, external perceptions of CDAN precipitated an identity crisis. Since many of the originating DANs had moved to latency, the newer DANs were not socialized into the network identity. This left the newer DANs to rely on past experience, also known as anticipatory socialization (see Aldrich, 1999; Gibson & Papa, 2000). This past experience led these new DANs to organize in the form most familiar to them, that of an organization. They began to try to operate like an organization, which the older DANs resisted. Ultimately this identity crisis was part of the struggle that lead to the demise of CDAN.
Affective Bonds/ Failure to Connect
RQ 4 focused on the impact of the virtual network structure on the
formation of affective bonds. In general, CDAN did not express
affective relationships or value affective bonds within their
communication. Melucci (1994) contends that the formation of
affective bonds is a key organizing force for SMOs. However, in part
due the virtual network structure, participants failed to either
form or value affective bonds within the larger CDAN network. When
considering the first face-to-face membership meeting (which never
occurred), the San Diego spokescouncil asked, "how effective it
will be – will it be productive or just social?" The
dichotomy between task communication and social communication is
clear. Social communication was not considered a valued way to build
CDAN, while task and training communication was considered valued.
There is evidence that some of the DANs were using social
face-to-face interactions to organize people. In the same minutes
meeting report in which the San Diego spokescouncil expressed doubt
as to the efficacy of "social" interaction, the Southeast
DAN spokes reported that they "had an awesome picnic in
Asheville with 65 people." If similar social interactions could
have occurred within the larger network, greater commitment to
national campaigns may have been gained.
The failure to coordinate an interpersonal encounter between DAN
members could be evidence of failure to build any affective bonds
within the organization. Nohum DAN was largely left holding the bag
for organizing the national meeting and frustration is evident in a
July 12 listsev posting:
the deadline for input on the annual meeting is Sunday. But I've heard almost nothing from anyone. Nobody has requested more time, either. So, if i don't hear anything by Sunday. I'm going to recommend to my fellow working group mems that we just go for it. If you trust us to do it right, well that's great and thank you. but this is a really great place for your input!!!
This failure to follow up on personal requests for assistance was a pattern with CDAN and may have contributed to the failure to build any affective bonds in the organizations as people experienced frustration with seeing their requests met with silence.
Theoretical
This research examined how the virtual network structure of CDAN
impacted its organizing processes. We argue that these essential
processes are transformed by the virtual network structure. The
geographic dispersion of nodes within the virtual network made it
possible for local organizing within nodes to hamper the
effectiveness of the larger network. Evolutionary theorists refer to
this organizing process as part-whole coevolution (Aldrich, 1999;
Baum, 1999). In part-whole coevolution, the parts of the
organization may evolve to meet their own needs and respond to their
own environment. This local optimization can be a determinant to the
whole organization's effectiveness. CDAN's inability to frame
external demands as a large network, the phase fractures among DANs
within CDAN, the lack of common identity across the network, and the
suppression of affective bonds made global network organizing
difficult.
This case study examined how the virtual network structure impacts
the framing of external opportunities. The structure appears to make
the network more aware of many opportunities for mobilization. This
is an important advantage for the network structure, allowing the
network to quickly adapt to an ever-changing and global environment
(Cravens, Percy, & Shopp, 1996; Djelic & Ainamo, 1999;
Goldman et al., 1994; Ring & Van de Ven, 1992). However, this
advantage quickly became overwhelming as the group struggled to cope
with many opportunities and a quickly changing internal structure.
One of the impacts of the virtual network structure was that the
group had difficulty distinguishing between local, national, and
global priorities. CDAN, initially formed to take on corporate
globalization, gradually became involved in local DAN projects. This
was due, in part, to the local autonomy aspect of virtual
organizing, and may be a hindrance to collective action. This
challenge has not been noted by previous virtual network
researchers, who assumed that the goal of profits would unite
for-profit virtual network organizations. Additionally, social
movement scholars have not considered how geographic dispersion
impacts these framing processes.
The geographic dispersion of the virtual network also negatively
impacted CDAN's phase processes. The group struggled with some parts
of the network operating in latency while other parts were
mobilizing. This is a new issue for social movement theory, since
Melucci (1994) does not address the presence of multiple phases
within the same organization. The tension among the local DANs
ultimately became destructive for this organization, because it
failed to manage the tension well. In order for SMOs to survive the
multiple phase fractures, groups must be able to enter and leave the
network freely.
The virtual network structure also impacted collective identity of
the organization. Dholakia and Bagozzi (2004) argue that for a
virtual community to successfully build a collective identity,
individuals must move beyond self-interested motivations to the
collective welfare of the group. Individual DAN identity and
interests were promoted above CDAN's interest. The organization
struggled with an overwhelming insurgence of new membership.
However, few wanted to socialize new members into the collective
CDAN. This led many new DANs to rely on anticipatory socialization
(Gibson & Papa, 2000) to interpret SMO activities. These
previous experiences led them to organize as an organization rather
than a network. Rosenfeld, Richman, and May (2004) note that
dispersed structures, like the virtual network form, tend to create
subcultures within organizations. These subcultures began to affect
CDAN, as conflicts over organizational identity arose within the
organization. The tension between collective definitions of
"organization," which was insular and had legitimacy, and
"network," which was open, new, and gave members autonomy,
ultimately became the identity crisis of the group. It is
interesting that structure became the discussion above CDAN welfare
and benefits. This discussion further illustrates the tension
between the larger collective CDAN interests and the individual DAN
interests.
The organizing tension highlights the role that "meeting"
may have for virtual network organizations. Throughout transcripts,
CDAN spokespersons highlighted the importance of meeting. The
failure of the first annual meeting, the failure of spokespersons to
show up to meetings, meetings occurring (or failing to occur) in
local DANs, and the importance of regular teleconference meetings
all highlight the importance of meeting. Virtual network
organizations still need to meet as a group in order to sustain
collective identity and to coordinate actions. While organizational
members may not be collocated in space, some synchronous
communication may be required for members to feel a part of a larger
collective.
Finally, the technological mediation impacted the formation of
affective bonds among participants. Social communication was
devalued in CDAN and members lacked trust that is often developed
through face-to-face communication. In addition, the antagonistic
nature of the organization exacerbated the mistrust of newcomers.
Affective bonds can be formed through technologically-mediated
communication (Hian et al., 2004) but virtual network organizations
must make efforts to promote social communication online.
Practical
CDAN and other SMOs are choosing virtual network structures because
of their many benefits, including flexibility, geographic
dispersion, and cost-effectiveness (Parker, 1996; Rutherford, 2000).
However, there are certain actions that must be taken in order to
avoid many of the pitfalls that CDAN experienced. First, virtual
SMOs need to create public and private spaces for communication.
Public spaces should be constructed from a public relations
perspective (Taylor, Kent, & White, 2001). This might include
features, such as opportunities to send messages to the
organization, to vote on issues, request information updates, and
complete opinion surveys. This online presence and interaction can
be used to frame issues, recruit potential members, socialize new
members, and provide a public forum to sort external opportunities.
Private spaces are also essential for virtual SMO communication.
Owens and Palmer (2003) contend that these private spaces are
important. "In-group discourses are based upon real-life
activism and on efforts to confront and deal with internal
conflicts. Consequently, they tend to be messier and more
contentious than out-group discourse" (p. 340). Private spaces
should include forums for group members to interact socially. The
formation of affective bonds is essential for SMOs (Melucci, 1994).
Through online social interaction, virtual network organizational
members can form close and enduring friendships (Hian et al., 2004).
Such interactions may encourage affective bonds that are so
important for enhancing SMO members' organizational commitment.
The current study demonstrates how geographic dispersion and use of
information communication technology impacted the organizing
processes of CDAN. While CDAN began strong, the organization had
difficulty filtering all the opportunities that were available. The
virtual network structure negatively impacted the balance between
latency and mobilization, since different geographic locations were
in different phases at different times. Finally, the virtualness of
the organization impacted the collective identity and formation of
affective bonds in the organization.
While the virtual network organizational form offers many benefits
to SMOs, it also presents many challenges. These challenges may be
overcome through the use of information communication technologies
that allow for more informal communication. In addition, virtual
SMOs must make a stronger effort to socialize new members than
traditional SMOs. Research has just begun to investigate the
potentials of this new organizational form.
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is an assistant professor in the Department of
Communication at North Dakota State University. She has centered her
research on evolutionary organizing and interorganizational
communication networks among social change NGOs.
Address: Department of Communication, North Dakota
State University, University Station-Box 5075, Fargo, North Dakota
58105-5075 USA
is a doctoral student in the Department of
Communication at North Dakota State University. His research
interests include radical and alternative media produced by social
movements. He teaches Mass Communication classes in the fields of
broadcasting, journalism and public relations.
Address: Department of Communication, North Dakota
State University, University Station-Box 5075, Fargo, North Dakota
58105-5075 USA